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Abstract
In his Widening Circles of Disidentification the Dutch sociologist Abram
de Swaan argues that enmity and violent conflicts occur most frequently
among groups that resemble one another, in transitional phases in which
the social differences between these groups are growing smaller. This
paper sets out to explore this thesis, in relation to the recent tensions in
the Netherlands generated by a trend towards radicalization among
second-generation Moroccan youth. Another relevant point that is
discussed is the way some ethnic minority juveniles are socialised and
integrated in Dutch society. Political radicalism among young Moroccans
in the Netherlands seems to be promoted by emancipation and coercive
family processes.
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Introduction 
An Amsterdam taxi-driver told me a few years ago that cockroaches were colonizing the taxi 
ranks outside Central Station. The ‘cockroaches’ this taxi-driver was referring to were his 
Dutch-Moroccan colleagues. Some police officers and people working within the justice 
department refer to ethnic Moroccans as ‘rats’, from a conviction that they generally lie and 
deny that they have committed any offence, even when they are caught in the act or the offences 
are as good as proven.1 One member of Amsterdam’s executive referred notoriously to a section 
of the city’s young Moroccan community as kutmarokkanen, ‘Moroccan [expletive]’. The 
ethnically Moroccan section of the Dutch community is frequently described in terms of harsh 
prejudice.2 If one were to make a ranking order of groups in the Netherlands, ethnic Moroccans 
come last.3 
 
These observations remind me of Widening Circles of Disidentification: On the Psycho- and 
Sociogenesis of the Hatred of Distant Strangers written in 1997 by the Dutch sociologist Abram 
de Swaan.4 De Swaan argues that enmity, hatred, and violent conflict occur most frequently 
among groups that resemble one another, in transitional phases in which the social differences 
between these groups are growing smaller. This contribution sets out to explore this thesis, in 
relation to the recent tensions in the Netherlands generated by a trend towards radicalization 
among ethnically Moroccan youths. In 2012 and 2013, more and more young Dutch citizens of 
Moroccan descent join the jihad in Syria.5 Fears about homegrown terrorism developed in 2004, 
when Mohammed Bouyeri ‘ideological’ killed Theo Van Gogh, modern filmmaker and great-
grand son of the artist Vincent Van Gogh.6 A popular website from and for Muslim youngsters 
in the Netherlands says, “The real criminals are the U.S. and UK regimes not Abu Hamza!”7 On 
the site, a young Dutch Muslim writes he would like to become a Mujahideen. According to the 
extremist group Sharia4Holland, Holland is ready for Islamic law. 
 
According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, the AIVD, young Muslims 
belonging to the second and third generation of Moroccan immigrants (primarily, but not 
exclusively, boys) have become easy to recruit for violent jihad.8 The results of a study made by 
Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Dutch Ministry of Justice confirm the findings of the 
                                           
1
 Bovenkerk, Frank, Etniciteit, criminaliteit en het strafrecht [Ethnicity, criminality and criminal law] (The 
Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2009). 
2
 Jaarrapport Integratie 2011 [Year report Integration 2011] (The Hague: SCP/WODC/CBS, September 2012). 
3
 Ibid. 
4 Abram de Swaan, “Widening Circles of Disidentification: On the Psycho- and Sociogenesis of the Hatred of 
Distant Strangers – Reflections on Rwanda,” Theory, Culture & Society 14:2 (1997): 105-122. 
5
 Emerson Vermaat, “More and More Young Muslims in Holland and Belgium Praise Hitler or Join the Jihad in 
Syria,” PipeLineNews.org, 25 March 2013, available at: 
http://www.pipelinenews.org/2013/mar/25/More-More-Young-Muslims-in-Holland-Belgium-Praise.html. 
6
 Ruud Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling van Mohammed B.” Experts’ report on Mohammed 
B., who murdered the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, commissioned by the Public Prosecutions Department 
for the use of courts of justice, May 2005, available at: www.sociosite.org/jihad/peters_rapport.pdf; Vidino, 
Lorenzo and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe. A policy report published by the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). (London: ICSR, 2012). 
7
 See http://www.shariah4holland.com, November 2012.  Abu Hamza al-Musri is a violent jihadist linked to al-
Qaida. 
8
 AIVD, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, Van dawa tot jihad. De diverse dreigingen van de 
radicale islam tegen de democratische rechtsorde [Dawa and Jihad. Threats of radical Islam against democracy]. 
(The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004); De Poot, Christianne and Anne 
Sonnenschein, Jihadi Terrorism in the Netherlands: A Description Based on Closed Criminal Investigations 
(Meppel: Royal Boom Publishers, 2011). 
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AIVD. Especially second and third Moroccan-Dutch migrant youth are attracted by Salafist and 
jihadist groups.9 Why are they particularly receptive to political radicalization and religious 
extremism and not first generation Dutch Muslims? These experts emphasize lack of 
integration, feelings of being threatened as a group, and of exclusion and discrimination.10 The 
policy of Dutch authorities is based on the assumption that violent radicalization is the 
byproduct of a lack of integration into mainstream society.11 
 
In the field of criminology, research supports the assumption that juveniles raised with a lot of 
coercion and physical force are more likely to resort to violence.12 Since ethnic minority youths 
have more frequently been socialized in ‘command families’ marked by an authoritarian 
structure and child abuse,13 they lag behind in the development of self-control, a skill that is 
expected of people living in the Netherlands. This is another point that is not discussed in the 
existing analyses of Muslim extremism. One can gain a better understanding of the growing 
radicalism among young ethnic Moroccans youths with analysis that incorporates the 
relationships within their families and those that exist between ethnic Moroccans and the wider 
Dutch community. This will be demonstrated in the following pages. 
 
Command Families 
Abram de Swaan has described long-term changes in the relationship between the powerful and 
less powerful in Western societies as a transition from ‘management by command’ to 
‘management by negotiation.’14 He views the reduction of power differences between 
individuals as a condition for their changing styles of interaction, which include greater mutual 
consultation in the effort to reach a compromise. This change has occurred in relations between 
men and women, employers and employees, professionals and their clients, older and younger 
people, but also in families, for instance between parents and children. As the government’s 
influence has grown, the inequality between those with and without power has declined since 
the Second World War, according to De Swaan. This has led to restrictions for the powerful and 
more freedom for those with less power, such as children. Management by negotiation 
presupposes more equality and less direct coercion and force, for instance in relations within 
family life and upbringing. This imposes higher demands on people’s ‘self-coercion’. Rather 
than a number of fixed standards, imposed from above, more alternative modes of conduct and 
expressions of emotion have become permissible for those with less power, but always subject 
to the conditions of mutual consultation and mutual consent:  
 
                                           
9
 Fermin, Alfons, Islamitische en extreem-rechtse radicalisering in Nederland [Islamic and extreme right-wing 
radicalization in the Netherlands] (The Hague: Ministry of Justice, 2009). Vidino, Lorenzo and James Brandon, 
Countering Radicalization in Europe. A policy report published by the London-based International Centre for 
the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2012. 
10 Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en democratische 
moslims in Nederland [Home-grown Fighters. Radical and democratic Moslims in the Netherlands] (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of 
Jihadi Radicalization,” European Journal of Criminology 5:1 (2008): 99-123. 
11
 Vidino, Lorenzo and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe. A policy report published by the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). (London: ICSR, 2012): 31. 
12
 Andrews, Don A. and James Bonta, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct Fifth Edition (New Providence, 
New Jersey: LexisNexis, Anderson Publishing, 2010), 252, 253. 
13
 Esmah Lahlah, Leontien van der Knaap and Stefan Bogaerts, “Dangerous Boys or Boys in Danger. Ethnic 
differences in the prevalence of child abuse and its effect on juvenile violent delinquency,” European Journal of 
Criminology 10:6 (2013): 641-658. 
14
 De Swaan, Abram, The management of normality: Critical essays in health and welfare (London: Routledge, 
1990). 
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“… people now compel others and themselves to take into consideration more aspects of 
more people at more moments, to arrange their relations accordingly and to subordinate 
their emotional management to these considerations.”15  
 
Clearly, forms of interaction that are based on mutual consent are not accompanied by the use 
of force and violence. 
 
Although the importance that is generally accorded to the inter-generational transfer of 
violence, and to the role of upbringing in the genesis of violent and coercive behavior, none of 
the studies published thus far of radicalization among Moroccan youths in the Netherlands have 
taken these aspects into account. The main losers in processes of modernization appear to be 
fathers in traditional ethnic minority families, who are losing power to their wives and their 
adolescent children. They have little status in their children’s eyes, because of their low social 
status in the Netherlands and their poor command of the Dutch language. Their position of 
authority is gradually eroded. Some fathers react with a renewed ‘command offensive’, by 
imposing even more draconian discipline and punishments than before, enrolling their children at 
Islamic schools or even sending them to Morocco. Others try to develop new ways of relating to 
their children by calmly talking things out and responding to their children’s desires and choices 
with consultation and negotiation.16 Management by negotiation, where Dutch mainstream 
society is based on, presupposes more equality and less direct coercion and force, for instance in 
relations within family life and upbringing. 
 
What chiefly emerges from interviews with Moroccan youths in the Netherlands, is that many 
families still operate with a large measure of authoritarian control.17 Dutch-style ‘management 
by negotiation’ appears to be very remote from today’s reality. Many of the young people 
interviewed say, for instance, that their parents ‘lay into them’ or ‘lash out’ or describe the poor 
communication with their parents as follows:  
 
“Well, like, ordinary Dutch people, they can just drink alcohol … And they can just go 
home afterwards, their parents know they drink, it’s o.k. But if [Moroccan youths] go 
home then, it’s a big problem. So you start off by lying … or perhaps you start just not 
coming home.”18 
 
A number of studies suggest that relations among the various members of Moroccan families in 
the Netherlands are frequently dysfunctional.19 Many fathers spend a lot of time outside the 
home, with other men, and scarcely concern themselves with their young children’s 
upbringing.20 They see childcare and upbringing as women’s work. The father is someone who 
has to be obeyed, not someone with whom the children discuss their problems. Many mothers 
act as go-betweens in the relationship between father and children. Since mothers and daughters 
                                           
15
 Ibid, 155, 156. 
16
 Pels, Trees, Respect van twee kanten. Een studie over last van Marokkaanse jongeren [Respect from Both 
Sides. Antisocial Behaviour among Moroccan Boys] (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2003). 
17
 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, 69. 
19
 Werdmölder, Hans, Een generatie op drift. De geschiedenis van een Marokkaanse randgroep [A Generation a 
Drift. The History of one Moroccan Peergroup at the Edge of Dutch Society] (Arnhem: Gouda Quint, 1990); 
Werdmölder, Hans, Marokkaanse lieverdjes. Crimineel en hinderlijk gedrag onder Marokkaanse jongeren 
[Moroccan Sweethearts. On Moroccan Juvenile Delinquency and Antisocial Behaviour] (Amersfoort: Balans, 
2005). 
20
 Pels, Trees, Marjolijn Distelbrink and Liselotte Postma, Opvoeding in de migratiecontext [Childrearing in the 
context of migration] (Utrecht: Verwey-Jonker Instituut, 2009). 
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spend a lot of time at home, they often develop a close relationship. Boys, on the other hand, 
may not develop a close relationship with any adult, and thus lack good role models. 
 
In their publication Dangerous boys or boys in danger the Dutch psychologists Lahlah, Van der 
Knaap and Bogaerts of Tilburg University demonstrate that Moroccan-Dutch boys are 
significantly more likely to report exposure to severe child abuse than Dutch boys.21 In addition, 
differences in exposure to child abuse are of sufficient magnitude to partially explain the 
observed differences in levels of violent offending between Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch boys. 
None of the studies sketch a positive picture of upbringing in Dutch-Moroccan families. 
Compared to ethnically Dutch parents, Moroccan parents are less accustomed to talking 
problems out and more inclined to resort to punitive action. In general, they are also less well 
able to help their children with their schoolwork. They appear to use punishments and beatings 
as important instruments in child raising.  
 
According to Patterson, coercive patterns of upbringing are the main precursor and predictor of 
severe delinquency and violent or threatening behavior on the part of young people in situations 
outside the family.22 A negative parent-child relationship can lead to hostile emotions and 
antisocial behavior.23 A characteristic shared by youths who display violent delinquent behavior 
and religious extremism is coerciveness. They generally try to attain their goals by using verbal 
or physical intimidation or violence. This coercive behavior is learned in the family situation in 
interaction with parents and other family members who serve as models, illustrating this 
behavior on countless occasions. 
 
Muslim extremism in Holland seems to be a manifestation of heated coercive behavior. 
Socialization in a ‘command family’ produces a greater risk of coercive and violent 
extremism.24 This parental approach produces arrears in training in self-control in the sense of a 
good management or controlled expression of emotions and managing relations through 
negotiations with one another. It leads children to avoid their parents and to decline to accept 
their authority.25 This estrangement between parents and children means that the latter tend to 
orient themselves strongly, as soon as they are able, towards peers with similar experiences. This 
helps them develop their own identity, but it also encourages behavior that can easily bring 
them into conflict with the rest of Dutch society. The multi-ethnic global culture also provides a 
range of unfavorable possibilities for identification, from the miserable, insecure situation of 
                                           
21 Esmah Lahlah, Leontien van der Knaap and Stefan Bogaerts, “Dangerous Boys or Boys in Danger. Ethnic 
differences in the prevalence of child abuse and its effect on juvenile violent delinquency,” European Journal of 
Criminology 10:6 (2013): 641-658. 
22
 Patterson, Gerald, Coercive Family Process (Eugene, Oregon: Castalia, 1982); Rolf Loeber and David P. 
Farrington, “Verschillende oorzaken van delinquentie tussen etnische en nationale groepen? Longitudinale 
analyses van criminaliteit onder jonge mannen in Pittsburgh en Londen” [Causes of Delinquency among 
Different Ethnic and National Groups. Longitudinal Analysis of Male Juvenile Delinquency in Pittsburgh and 
London] Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 46:4 (2004): 330-347. 
23
 Carolyn Smith and Terence P. Thornberry, “The relationship between Childhood Maltreatment and Adolecent 
Involvement in Delinquency,” Criminology 33:4 (1995): 451-482; Carolyn Smith and David P. Farrington, 
“Continuities in Antisocial Behavior and parenting across Three Generations,” Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry 45:2 (2004): 230-247. 
24
 As can be read for instance in the biography of student Lhabib B. and the report professor dr. J.T.V.M. de Jong 
wrote as an expert witness for the court where Lhabib B. was tried. Lhabib B. was a member of the 
Hofstadgroup, a loose-knit radical Islamist group youngsters, promoting the legitimacy of killing non-Muslims. 
With them was Mohammed B. – the murderer of filmaker Theo van Gogh. The members of the Hofstadgroup 
are predominantly of Moroccan descent. I would like to thank professor De Jong for giving me the report. 
25
 Mieke Komen, “Dangerous children: Juvenile delinquency and judicial intervention in the Netherlands,” 
Crime, Law & Social Change 37:4 (2002): 379-401. 
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North African young people in the banlieues of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon to the struggle and 
hardships of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere. Some young people who have 
been born and bred in the Netherlands call Osama bin Laden a ‘cool guy’. They identify with 
‘martyrs’ who are prepared to die (and to kill) for their faith and their ideals, on the principle: “I 
die, therefore I exist.”26  
 
Emancipation 
 “And I am indeed urging that young people be recruited for the Jihad: WAKE UP! 
LOOK AROUND YOU! MUSLIMS ARE BEING SLAUGHTERED AND YOU 
CAN’T DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT BECAUSE YOU’RE BLEEDING TO DEATH 
YOURSELF! Liberate yourself! Get out of that coffee shop, get out of that bar, get out 
of that corner. Answer the call LA ILAHA ILLA ALLAH. Join the caravan of the 
Martyrs. Rise up out of your deep sleep, rise up and shake off the dust of humiliation. 
Rise up and answer the call of HAJJA AL JIHAAD. …” (letter entitled ‘To catch a 
wolf’ written by Mohammed B., the murderer of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, 
March 2004).27  
 
From Buijs and Harchaoui’s research of the literature, it emerges that more highly educated 
young people are more susceptible to radicalism.28 They have developed their abilities, have the 
prospect of improving their position in society, and are poised for assimilation into that society, 
but they are confronted with forms of discrimination and social exclusion that arise directly, in 
their eyes, from the prejudices of the established classes.29 
 
In an essay on the causes of criminal behavior among ethnic minorities, the criminologist Frank 
Bovenkerk shows that ethnic Moroccans in the Netherlands adapt far more rapidly than other 
groups of migrants.30 The number of ethnic Moroccans entering higher education has doubled 
over the past ten years. Dutch-Turkish people, for instance, are far more enclosed within their 
own ethnic enclave. They focus heavily on contact with their own ethnic group, and are far less 
progressive in their views.31 Social and cultural integration appears to correlate positively with 
the extent of registered crime in certain ethnic groups. 
 
The growing equality in the relations between native Dutch ‘established’ and ‘outsiders’ gave 
more freedom and more possibilities to the latter, inclusive of ethnic minority youth. Ethnic 
                                           
26
 Lecture given by dr. Miriyam Aouragh as part of seminar held by the Amsterdam School for Social Science 
Research, on 16 May 2006. 
27
 Quoted [in Dutch] in Ruud Peters, “De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling van Mohammed B.” Experts’ 
report on Mohammed B., who murdered the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, commissioned by the Public 
Prosecutions Department for the use of courts of justice, May 2005: 11, available at: 
www.sociosite.org/jihad/peters_rapport.pdf. Theo van Gogh made a film about the Koran and violence against 
women. LA ILAHA ILLA ALLAH = ‘There is no god but Allah’; HAJJA AL JIHAAD = ‘Join the jihad’. 
28
 Frank J. Buijs and Sadik Harchaoui, “Islamitisch radicalisme en rekrutering in Nederland,” in Frank J. Buijs 
and Mieke Komen (eds.), Terrorisme [Terrorism], Special issue of Proces, Journal of Criminal Justice 82:2 
(2003): 98-109; Cf Ben-Simhon, Ron, The Motivational Elements and Characteristics of ‘Home-Grown’ Islamic 
Terrorists. A Comparative Study (Herzliya: ICT, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012). 
29
 Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: the Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst & Company, 2004). 
30
 Bovenkerk, Frank, “Essay over oorzaken van allochtone misdaad” [Causes of Crime Among Ethnic 
Minorities], in Jan Lucassen and Arie de Ruijter (eds.), Nederland multicultureel en pluriform? (Amsterdam: 
Aksant, 2002), 209-246. 
31
 Jaarrapport Integratie 2011 [Year report Integration 2011] (The Hague: SCP/WODC/CBS, September 2012); 
Huijnk, Willem and Jaco Dagevos, Dichter bij elkaar? De sociaal-culturele positie van niet-westerse migranten 
in Nederland [Closer together? The social-cultural position of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands] (The 
Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2012). 
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minorities’ emancipation improved their position in society.32 Compared to Dutch-Turks, 
Moroccan youngsters (including those involved in terrorist activities in the Netherlands) are 
quite well integrated into mainstream society—according to standards like their language 
fluency, levels of education and levels of contact with native Dutch and non-Muslim society.33 
Moroccan youngsters are nearer to native Dutch and non-Muslim society than their parents or 
Dutch-Turks. 
 
But while it is true that Dutch-Moroccan young people have more opportunities than their 
fathers (to study at university, to find a good position on the labor market, for instance) they 
have still fewer opportunities than their ethnically Dutch contemporaries.34 Many ethnic-
minority youths regularly encounter discrimination.35 Highly educated Dutch Moroccans report 
more discrimination than those with less education.36 Discrimination and prejudice expressed 
by police officers, politicians and others reveal to them the feelings of aversion they arouse 
among the Dutch establishment classes. Precisely those who belong to the second and third 
generations of migrant groups refuse to accept this. They do not want to be treated like foreign 
visitors. 
 
Negative images do not vanish by themselves, however, they can be dispelled only by rejecting 
them and by exerting pressure on the established classes—by making unequal power 
relationships equal. Precisely in power relationships that are in the process of becoming more 
equal, such as those between Dutch-Moroccan and ethnically Dutch people in the Netherlands, 
there is an increase of resistance among the second and third generation of those with less 
power, and more irritation, distaste and conflict between the established order and the 
‘outsiders’. Whether boys who feel rejected and sidelined become apathetic or become 
radicalized and recalcitrant seems to depend on what stage the emancipation process in which 
the group to which they belong has reached. From this vantage point, it is not surprising that 
some second and third generation Dutch Moroccans are becoming radicalized, have an 
increasing readiness to join violent movements within radical Islam, and that they cherish 
feelings of resentment towards the majority. 
 
Several decades ago, the sociologists Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson researched the relations 
between the original inhabitants and newcomers in a working-class neighborhood of an 
industrial city in England.37 In an introductory essay, Elias presents a theory of stigmatization: 
once a particular section of the population has a sense of ‘us’, it leads to the stigmatization of 
outsiders. The established classes regard the newcomers as inferior and see themselves as 
superior. In his introduction, Elias maintains that the usual tendency to explain tensions between 
established groups and outsiders in terms of racial, ethic or religious differences is misguided. 
                                           
32
 Emancipation is seen as a (complex) process by which people get more possibilities and freedom to manage 
and organize their own lives (not only in the field of income and career). 
33
 Vidino, Lorenzo and James Brandon, Countering Radicalization in Europe. A policy report published by the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) (London: ICSR, 2012). 
34 Boog, Igor, Monitor Rassendiscriminatie 2005 [Monitor Race Discrimination] (Rotterdam: Argus, 2006): 61. 
35
 Nievers, Eline and Iris Andriessen, Discriminatiemonitor niet-westerse migranten op de arbeidsmarkt 2010 
[Monitor Discrimination against non-Western migrants on the Dutch labor market 2010] (The Hague: The 
Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2010); Andriessen, Iris, Eline Nievers and Jaco Dagevos, Op 
achterstand. Discriminatie van niet-westerse migranten op de arbeidsmarkt [At a disadvantage. Discrimination 
against non-Western migrants on the Dutch labor market] (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research, 2012). 
36
 Boog, Igor, Monitor Rassendiscriminatie 2005 [Monitor Race Discrimination] (Rotterdam: Argus, 2006): 8. 
37
 Elias, Norbert and John L. Scotson, The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Inquiry into 
Community Problems (London: Frank Cass, 2nd ed., London: Sage, [1965] 1994). 
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In his view, these are all secondary matters. As long as there is a really big gap in power 
between the established classes and outsiders, tensions and conflicts remain largely dormant. 
They are not expressed until the balance of power shifts in favor of the latter. 
 
A shift of this kind appears to be taking place in the relationship between Dutch-Moroccan and 
ethnically Dutch groups in the Netherlands. Precisely because the position of Dutch Moroccans 
has become stronger, they feel prejudice, disadvantage and discrimination more keenly, and 
have more opportunities to fight back. Islam-bashing stimulates them to accentuate their Islamic 
identity and seek confrontation with ‘the West’. 
 
Conclusion 
The growing susceptibility of young Dutch Moroccans to radicalization is the outcome of inter- 
related behavior, experiences, motives, feelings, and views about good and evil. In the literature, 
little attention is paid either to the relationship between religious extremism and coercive 
patterns of upbringing, and to changes in the balance of power between Dutch Moroccans and 
the wider Dutch community. The customary management of emotions and relationships in 
Dutch Moroccan families is at present remote from the negotiation management that is 
customary in the ethnically Dutch community – in the family, at school, and at work. 
Socialization in a ‘command family’ is likely to foster coercive and violent behavior in later life. 
The inequality between the powerful and those with less power has declined in the Netherlands. 
This has led to more freedom for those with less power, such as Dutch-Moroccan youths.  
 
Young Dutch Moroccans have better prospects than their parents, but their opportunities on the 
education and labor market, and hence their chances of achieving prosperity, are less than those 
of their ethnically Dutch peers. Meanwhile, their position within Dutch society is stronger than in 
the past, and this ironically generates more tension. Especially more highly educated Dutch-
Moroccan youths are sensitive to discrimination, bashing and inequality, and appear to be 
quicker to react than past generations. They are more susceptible to radicalization and 
extremism than their parents—and more than their Dutch-Turkish peers—because they are 
more like ‘us’.  
 
Dutch authorities focus initiatives to prevent the radicalization of new ones on the 
reinforcement of social cohesion and integration, debates on Islam and programs to learn how to 
deal with criticisms of their own faith. These responses are ineffective. Because it’s not the 
growing contrast between Dutch Moroccans and the wider Dutch community that give rise to 
homegrown violent Muslim extremism but the loss or diminishing of social differences. 
Political radicalism among young Muslims in the Netherlands is promoted not by Islam or a 
lack of integration, but precisely, by emancipation. 
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